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RECENT DECISIONS
classified directly under the heading of constructive contempt of
court. An inherent power within the general jurisdiction of courts
4
is to punish those who have been guilty of a contempt of court.
In the well-written opinion in the instant case, it is stated that
the report published, neither in its nature nor in its purpose, could
be deemed to fall within the confines of fair criticism. It is settled
that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech is not so broad
as to permit publications which are of such a nature as to interfere
with the due administration of justice.5 Furthermore, "the power of
the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people in its integrity and
intelligence. Take away this faith and the moral influence of the
courts is gone and the respect for the law is destroyed. * * * The one
element in government and society which the people desire above all
things else to keep from the taint of suspicion is the due administration of justice in the courts." 6

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER IN FIRsT DEGREE-CONTEMPORANEOUS
FELONY. Again the Court of Appeals has had occasion to reverse a verdict
in a murder trial on the ground of an erroneous charge of the lower
court. At the trial of this case, controverted evidence was introduced
to show that the defendant, while riding in an automobile, was
ordered to stop by two policemen who suspected him of being guilty
of the commission of a crime; and that the defendant thereupon
shot first one, and then the other, officer. The trial court sent the
case to the jury with the single charge of murder in the first
degree.' This charge was based on the mistaken theory that the
defendant, in killing one policeman was committing the felony which
supplied the intent necessary to make out first degree murder in
the second killing. Held, judgment reversed and new trial granted.
People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).
It has long been the rule that where one, while engaged in the
commission of a felony, kills another, he is guilty of first degree
murder. 2 However, it is in the application of this doctrine that
confusion has arisen. Before such theory ought to be relied on by
the prosecution, it should be able to show that the felony complained
of was not a part of the homicide and merged therein. It must show
that while the felony upon which it relies may be a part of the
homicide, yet, that the other elements thereof are so distinct from
that of the homicide, as not to be an ingredient thereof.3 Thus in
People v. Wagner,4 the defendant, while assaulting a woman, shot and
killed the deceased who had come to the aid of the assailed. The
conviction was affirmed, the court reiterating the rule: "The felony
that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independ4Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).

'People v. News-Times Pub. Co., 35 Colo. 253, 205 U. S. 454 (1907);
State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
'In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 680, 76 S.E. 397, 404 (1912).
1
N. Y. Penal Code, § 1044, Sub. 2.
'4 Black. Corn., §§ 178-201.
'People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912).
4245
N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
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ent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein, as e. g., robbery or larceny or burglary or rape.'.
In arriving at some conclusion it is best to divide the "felony"
nmurders into two classes. The first, where the felony relied on is
entirely different in nature from the homicide; the second, where
the felony is some grade of assault and where, of necessity, the line
of demarcation grows indistinct. In the first class are those cases
where the inculpatory facts are susceptible of only one interpretation.
Either the accused was engaged in an independent felony at the time
of the killing or he did not murder at all. Here it is not5 required
to give more than the single charge of first degree murder. In the
second class are those cases where the felony is some degree or
grade of assault. Here the facts are susceptible of varying deductions and consequently there must be a charge of whatever form6 and
grade of homicide comportable with the proof and indictment.
The principal case falls within the second class. Here it was
difficult to say where the first assault ended, and the second began,
or that there were, in fact, two assaults. In such a situation it would
save much trouble and expense for the state to give all six charges;7
for, most cases of this kind, proceeding on this theory, are reversed.
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An ordinance of the City of New York passed April 22nd, 1924,
changed the name of two blocks on Fourth Avenue, Manhattan, between Thirty-second and Thirty-fourth Streets, to Park Avenue, and
directed the borough president to renumber the buildings on the easterly added portion of Park Avenue. Until the ordinance directing
the change was passed the street known as Park Avenue extended
from Thirty-fourth -Street, north, 140 feet wide and parked in the
center. The number "One Park Avenue" had been allotted to the
house of the plaintiff Martha W. Bacon, and had been used by her
and previous owners for many years. The block front on the east
side of Fourth Avenue between Thirty-second and Thirty-third Streets
was acquired in 1923 for the defendant corporation, which erected
thereon a large commercial structure which under the old numbering
would be 461-477 Fourth Avenue. Prior to the adoption of the resolution to rename and renumber the two blocks, Fourth Avenue was
a commercial street one hundred feet wide in its entire length, while
Park Avenue was a residential street. Shortly after the purchase
of the property by the defendant corporation, and at its instigation,
a resolution was passed by the Board of Aldermen to widen the
street on which its property fronted and it was subsequently physically
widened so as to bring the east curb in line with the east curb of
Park Avenue north of Thirty-fourth Street. This action was brought
by the plaintiff to have the ordinance passed April 22, 1924, renam'People
"People
132 N. E.
79 (1927).
'People

v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910).
v. Moran, T*upra; People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454,
147 (1921); People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E.
v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 177 N. E. 6 (1906) ; People v.

Spohr, supra; People v. Van Norman, supra.

